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Abstract 
 Given the importance of fiscal balance for ensuring a sustainable fiscal policy, we 
conduct an empirical examination of fiscal dynamics in the United States in response to 
unsustainable budget deviations. We concentrate on the role of political factors, namely the 
Republican - Democrat presidential divide, in determining the fiscal response to budget 
disequilibria. Making use of an asymmetric cointegration framework, we explore politically 
motivated fiscal asymmetries in the US, from Eisenhower to Obama. We conclude that 
political factors such as the government’s political quadrant and the timing of elections are 
important determinants of the fiscal response to unsustainable budget deviations. 
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1. Introduction 
 Fiscal policy is, alongside monetary policy, a central macroeconomic tool, allowing 
for counter-cyclical policies that minimize business cycles and thus partially insure against 
economic instability. The efficient and sensible use of this macroeconomic artifice requires 
the maintenance of a sustainable fiscal balance. This work project explores how is fiscal 
balance recovered and the role of political factors in this process, in the case of the US.  
 Focusing on the political dimension of fiscal policy and its impact on fiscal aggregate 
behaviour, we explore possible political asymmetric fiscal responses to budget deviations. 
This political bias has been explored in the economic literature, having been identified as an 
important element in non-linear fiscal dynamics.  
 Empirical studies of fiscal dynamics tend to assume a benevolent, non-partisan, and 
non-opportunistic policy-maker. This ignores the fact that political ideologies and the timing 
of elections may affect the government´s political priorities and, hence, fiscal behaviour. 
Taking political factors as determinants of fiscal asymmetries is a relevant addition to the 
existing literature on US fiscal policy. 
 Analysing fiscal aggregates’ behaviour from Eisenhower to Obama’s administration, 
we conclude that political factors such as the government’s political quadrant and the timing 
of elections are significant determinants of the fiscal aggregates’ response to unsustainable 
budget deviations.  
 This work project is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the academic literature. 
Section 3 presents the methodology adopted. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
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2. Literature Review 
 Hibbs (1977) first proposed a Partisan Theory of economic policy, whereby political 
parties’ macroeconomic policies derive from their constituencies’ preferences. Leftist parties 
would tend to focus on lowering unemployment, whereas right-wing parties prioritize low 
inflation. Policies by left and right would accommodate labor and business interests, 
respectively. To promote employment, leftist parties would tend to increase public spending. 
Rightist parties, on the other hand, would pursue stricter fiscal discipline with a view to keep 
inflation in check. 
 In addition to the Partisan Theory, two additional strands of the literature suggest 
political economy determinants of fiscal dynamics. First, Nordhaus’ (1975) Political Business 
Cycle Theory assumes that the Incumbent looks forward to coming elections and adjusts 
economic policy in an opportunistic way, so to maximize the chances of re-election. A cycle 
may emerge with the Incumbent “starting with relative austerity in early years and ending 
with the spending potlatch right before elections”. Another strand of the literature, put 
forward in Persson and Svensson (1989) advocate that conservative governments drive up 
public deficits as a way to constrain future spending by leftist cabinets. According to the 
authors, a conservative government expecting to be substituted by a government in favour of 
higher public spending can postpone fiscal adjustments or expand fiscal deficit, so as to limit 
the fiscal policy of the next government. In parallel, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) conclude 
that government debt can also be used as a strategic variable by opposing policymakers. 
Aiming dissimilar public goods, policymakers will be inclined to influence its successor fiscal 
policy through government debt. 
 Several authors have empirically explored this theoretical link between left-wing and 
public spending. Cameron (1978) tackles the “expansion of the role of government in the 
distribution and consumption of national income”, identifying a clear partisan effect where 
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the partisanship of the government determines the rate of expansion of the public economy, 
with left-wing parties associated with higher rate of growth of both spending and taxation. 
Volkerink and de Haan (2001) analyse public deficits in a political economy perspective. 
According to the authors, left-wing parties do not indulge in larger public deficits, as they 
tend to accompany higher spending with higher taxation, as concluded by Cameron. Mulas-
Granados (2003) and Tavares (2004) study the political economy of fiscal adjustments. 
Mulas-Granados concludes that leftist governments tended to increase public spending 
between 1970 to 1994 and, in the years when fiscal adjustments became necessary, they 
resorted mostly to increases in taxation. Tavares showed that leftist governments rely mostly 
on taxation for adjustments, while rightist governments rely primarily on spending cuts. 
Tavares concludes that expenditure based adjustments pursued by leftist governments tend to 
be more successful. 
 Motivated by the theoretical and empirical literature, we explore the impact of the 
political quadrant of the federal government and the timing of elections on fiscal balance in 
the US. Fiscal policy choices are eventually constrained by an intertemporal budget 
constraint. How is fiscal balance redressed after a deviation? Which fiscal aggregates, and in 
what direction, move to redress it? Does the party in power affect that response? What is the 
influence of elections on the Incumbent’s policies, and is that influence different depending 
on the political quadrant in power? 
 According to the literature, there are four ways to regain fiscal balance. Firstly the tax-
spend hypothesis, with two directions of causality suggested. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) 
advocate that an increase in taxes results in the perception by the public of the real price of 
expenditure and a consequent decrease in spending. In the opposite direction, Friedman 
(1978) suggests that, in a fiscal adjustment setting, an increase in taxes will result in an 
expansion of expenditure.  
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 Subsequently, the spend-tax hypothesis proposed by Barro (1979) - In a ricardian 
equivalence setting, expenditure today implies higher taxes tomorrow. Next, the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) - Taxes and expenditure 
are synchronously decided. Finally, the institutional separation hypothesis proposed by 
Wildavsky (1988), where each fiscal aggregate is independent from the homologous. 
 Empirically, Payne (2003) surveys the tax-spend literature and uncovers a wide 
discrepancy across results for the United States that rely on tests of Granger-causality. Miller 
and Russek (1989) introduced cointegration, allowing for short and long-run horizons. They 
still come across substantial inconsistency. Given the variety of results, researchers allowed 
for non-linearities in the behaviour of fiscal aggregates. Arestis, Cipollini and Fattouh  (2004) 
relaxed the assumption of symmetric adjustments and, resorting to TAR and MTAR 
techniques, constructed an asymmetric cointegration model. The main conclusion is the 
identification of a soft budget constraint, whereby fiscal aggregates respond significantly to 
deficit-enhancing deviations only after a given threshold has been passed. Ewing et al. (2006) 
and Cipollini, Fattouh and Mouratidis (2009) also undertook an exploration of non-linear 
fiscal responses, confirming that expenditure and taxes only respond to budgetary 
disequilibria above a given threshold. Young (2011) introduces an asymmetric linear model 
approach, assuming a priori asymmetries. In contrast with common non-linear studies, Young 
finds a significant short-run causal relationship between tax and expenditure, more 
specifically positive responses of expenditure to increases in taxes. 
 Expanding the non-linear analysis of fiscal dynamics, we explore how political 
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3. Methodology  
 Recently, Kollias, Papadamou and Psarianos (2014) have explored asymmetric UK 
fiscal dynamics, differentiating between Labour and Conservatives. The authors concluded 
that “Conservative Governments invariably tend to operate under a hard budget constraint, 
exhibiting a stronger fiscal vigilance vis-à-vis Labour administrations”. We follow the 
methodology in Kollias et al., modelling US fiscal dynamics as an asymmetric process, 
sensitive to partisan and electoral motivations.  
 Firstly, following the fiscal dynamics literature, we model the US fiscal aggregates in 
a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), allowing for a simultaneous exploration of short 
and long run dynamics: 





𝑇! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝐺! + 𝑒!!!         !        𝑒!!! = 𝑇! − 𝛽!𝐺! − 𝑐 
 
 In our models the Error Correction Term (ECT), 𝑒!!!, represents deviations from a 
linear combination of   𝑌! = 𝑇!  𝐺! , that departs from a long-run equation where 𝛽! = 1. 
Following Legrenzi and Milas (2012), we model the cointegration relation as an estimate for a 
sustainable balance, the ECT thus representing deviations from a sustainable balance1 - 
positive ECTs represent surplus-enhancing deviations while negative ECTs represent deficit-
enhancing deviances.  From such a specification our analysis focuses on the adjustment 
coefficients present in each VECM, representing the fiscal aggregates response to deviations 
from a long run sustainable balance equilibrium. 
 Firstly, motivated by Ewing et al.’s (2006) a priori foundation for modelling 
asymmetrical fiscal responses to disequilibrium- “fiscal policymakers may respond differently 
to a deviation of the deficit or surplus from its long-run trend” - we follow Kollias et al. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  According to Quintos (1995), with 𝛽! = 1 we have strong sustainability in the fiscal balance with receipts accompanying 
fully expenditure. With 0 <  𝛽! <  1, we have expenditure expanding at a higher rate than receipts, incurring in weak 
sustainability debt marketing by the federal state being challenged.  
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(2014) by allowing politically motivated fiscal asymmetry. Assuming that Democrats and 
Republicans react differently to departures from a balanced budget, we estimate a VECM 
where the ECT is interacted with a political dummy which signals Democrat and Republican 
administrations: 
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!! + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!! + 𝜀!   
 
 (2)  
𝐷𝑒𝑚 1,𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡  𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛0,𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛  𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝑒𝑝 = (1− 𝐷𝑒𝑚) 
 
 Secondly, we explore an asymmetry of signal that can change with the political 
quadrant of the government. For this we separate the ECT in two regimes – a surplus-
enhancing regime, focusing only on positive values of the ECT and a deficit-enhancing 
regime, with negative values of the ECT. Both regimes are then differentiated into Democrat 
and Republican observations with the interaction of both ECTs with a political dummy:  
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!! + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!! + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!! + 𝜀! (3) 
 
 Next, having in mind that responses to budget disequilibrium may originate 
endogenously or exogenously, that is, automatically or discretionarily, we expand the Kollias 
et al. framework with an exogenous dummy that distinguishes fiscal responses from 
discretionary and automatic, differentiating between Democrats and Republicans: 
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝜀! (4) 
 
 By interacting the ECT with an exogenous dummy we signal discretionary fiscal 
responses to budget disequilibrium, allowing us to estimate separately automatic and 
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discretionary fiscal responses. The motivation for such fiscal response discrimination is the 
narrative approach developed in the fiscal multipliers literature, characterized by a pre-
identification of spending and revenue changes and a post-analysis of the effects of such 
episodes2 on Output.  
 Subsequently, motivated by the main conclusion of non-linear literature, that is, fiscal 
aggregates only respond significantly to deficit-enhancing deviations above a given threshold, 
we interact the ECT with a dimension dummy. Dividing the ECT into unusually large and 
normal budget deviations, we are able to estimate fiscal responses to large and normally 
dimensioned budget disequilibria. Both regimes are also politically differentiated, following 
Kollias et. al: 
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝜀! (5) 
 
 After, following Nordhaus, we focus on electoral motivated changes in fiscal 
dynamics. Assuming that Democrats and Republicans may react differently to budget 
deviations in electoral and non-electoral periods, we interact the ECT with an election dummy 
that signals a pre-election period totalling 5 quarters. A partisan differentiation is again 
present in the model: 
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝜀! (6) 
 
 Finally, to assess if policymakers in the US follow a Persson and Svensson/Alesina 
and Tabellini hypothesis, that is, if Democrats and Republicans strategically alter their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et. al (1999), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and, more recently, Romer and 
Romer (2010) and Ramey (2011). 
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response to budget disequilibria when in trigger-elections3, we interact the ECT with a 
trigger-election dummy that signals a pre-election period of 5 quarters: 
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚. 𝑒!!!!"# + 𝑅𝑒𝑝. 𝑒!!!!"# + 𝜀! (7) 
 
 We thus explore six strands of asymmetries: (1) partisan asymmetry, (2) signal 
asymmetry, (3) exogenous asymmetry, (4) dimension asymmetry, (5) election asymmetry and 
(6) trigger-election asymmetry. All six models are estimated with and without partisan 
differentiation, for comparison purposes thus being initially estimated 12 models. 
 For analysis purposes, we estimate for Models 5 and 6 expanded frameworks where 
adding to election asymmetries we also assume signal asymmetry: 
 
𝑌! = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝐷𝑒𝑚!. 𝑒!!!!! + 𝑅𝑒𝑝!. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚!. 𝑒!!!!"  
           +𝑅𝑒𝑝!. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚!. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝!. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝐷𝑒𝑚!. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑝!. 𝑒!!!!" + 𝜀! (8) 
 
4. Data 
 Our empirical analysis on US fiscal outcomes focuses on federal expenditure and 
receipts. Being quarterly series, from 1952:Q1 to 2015:Q2, each quarter refers to the calendar 
year, all variables being transformed into natural logarithms.  
 Both series are seasonally adjusted at annual rates from the source4. For simplification 
purposes, both are deflated with the US GDP implicit deflator, obtained from the Federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Elections where there is a shift in the political quadrant of the government. 
4 Seasonal adjustment being performed at the source refers to adjustment technics such as X-12 and X-13 ARIMA methods, 
official seasonal adjustment technics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Reserve Economic Research (FRED), and divided by the US population presented with a 













 Focusing on federal expenditure, to assess all spending dynamics which affect the 
federal budget we focus on Line 42 of the National Income and Product Accounts Table 3.2, 
that is, Total Federal Expenditures. Federal receipts, as federal expenditure, are original from 
BEA. Extracted also from NIPA Table 3.2, this variable refers to Line 39, Total Federal 
Receipts. 
 Methodologically, we recur to six dummy variables that aim to capture dissimilar 
types of fiscal response asymmetries6: 
(1) Political Dummy: This variable signals the quadrant of the federal 
administration in power, if Democrat (=1) or Republican (=0). We assume that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Extracted from NIPA’s Table 2.1, Line 40, according to BEA being the series used to compute quarterly per capita 
variables. 
6	  See Technical Appendix, Figures 2-7, for a graphical representation of the described variables in interaction with the ECT. 
Figure 1. US Expenditures and Receipts per Capita, 1952:Q1 to 2015:Q2 
Democrats Republicans 
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there is an institutional lag after elections, the elected government assuming full 
office in the second quarter after elections7. 
(2) Signal Dummy: Focused on the ECT signal, if positive (=1) or if negative (=0).  
(3) Exogenous Dummy: Constructed with both Romer and Romer’s (2010) 
identified tax episodes and Ramey’s (2011) expenditure episodes, it focuses on 
the character of each fiscal response. Unlike the remaining dummy variables, the 
exogenous dummy is available only until 2013:Q48. There is no discrimination 
between tax and expenditure changes as this variable focuses on discretionary 
fiscal changes, of both aggregates. 
(4) Dimension Dummy: It concentrates on the dimension of the ECT, 
discriminating between abnormal and normal ECTs. Abnormally dimensioned 
ECTs are observations that surpass ± 1 Std. Error (=1), while normally 
dimensioned ECTs are observations within ± 1 Std. Error (=0). 
(5) Election Dummy: Predominantly focused on election periods, it signals for each 
election a five-quarter period. Following the institutional lag assumption, this 
dummy focuses on the election year and the institutional lag quarter.  
(6) Trigger-Election Dummy: Following the construction of the previous variable, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Elections in the US take place on the fourth quarter of the election year. The Presidential Inauguration takes place in the 
after-election quarter. We assume that fiscal aggregates will only respond fully to the newly elected administration on the 
second quarter after elections. 
8 Ramey’s expenditure episodes are available from 1889:Q4 to 2013:Q4 while Romer and Romer’s tax episodes are 
available from 1945:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The exogenous dummy signals each expenditure and tax episode identified by both 
authors from 1952:Q1 to 2013:Q4. 
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5. Estimation 
 As presented in Section 3, an estimation of a VECM and an underlying cointegration 
relation between fiscal aggregates is estimated, as it allows an exploration of short and long 
run dynamics in a multivariate framework. A first step consists on assessing whether the 
variables have the same order of integration, more specifically if they are I(1), as this is a 
necessary condition for the existence of cointegration. 
 As observable in Table 1, from the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the 
heteroskedasticity robust Philips Perron (PP) and the efficient unit root statistic, the Elliot, 
Rothenberg and Stock Test, all unit root tests indicate that both receipts and expenditure are   
I(1)9. As the integration order condition is satisfied, we proceed on testing for cointegration. 
 Lütkepohl et al. (2001) identify a higher susceptibility from the trace test to size 
distortions when dealing with small samples. Aiming to minimize size distortions we focus on 
the maximum eigenvalue test. Analysing such statistic, the null of no CE relations is rejected 
with a 5% significance level. On the other hand, the null of at least one relation cannot be 
rejected at standard levels, this leading us to conclude that US federal receipts and 
expenditures are cointegrated, exhibiting one CE relation.  
 In theory, building on an assumption of Gaussian residuals, the Johansen test requires 
a Test VAR with Gaussian residuals for a valid inference on such statistic. Observing Table 1, 
the Test VAR exhibits non-normal residuals and a heteroscedastic variance. 
 In practice, according to Silvapulle and Podivinsky (2000) the Johansen tests are 
robust to non-normality in finite samples, allowing us to draw conclusions on the test when 
dealing with non-normal residuals. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For robustness purposes we test the unit root hypothesis with the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS), a 
stationary test, the same conclusion arising. 
	  
 




 1. Rejection of Null Hypothesis with 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) Significance Level. 
 2. The Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock were performed for both variables with the MAIC Lag Criteria. 
 3. Considering Receipts, the MAIC is 2 in Levels and 10 in 1st Differences while the SC is 0 and 1 in 1st Differences. 
 4. Considering Expenditures, the MAIC is 4 in Levels and 4 in 1st Differences while the SC is 4 in Levels and 3 in 1st Differences. 
 5. The Test VAR is composed by five autoregressive terms, hence it is a VAR(5). 
 6. The Portmanteau VAR is performed for 16 Lags and refers to the Adjusted Q-Stat. 
 
 Focusing on heteroscedasticity, Maki (2013) concentrates on the maximum eigenvalue 
test and supports the robustness of such test to GARCH processes. ARCH/GARCH processes 
surge within high-frequency data, where data volatility is persistently variable, thus allowing 
for consistent volatility modelling. Given the low frequency of the analysed data, the 
identified heteroscedasticity will follow mild ARCH/GARCH processes, thus the Max. Eigen. 
Statistic is a valid target for statistical inference. 
 By confirming the robustness of the derived statistics and hence the validity of the 
identified cointegration relation, we ensue on estimating a VECM as follows: (1) The ECT, 
product of the CE relation, is estimated with Full Information MLE, following the Johansen 
cointegration approach. (2) The ECT is exogenously inserted into the 1st differenced VAR, 
forming the VECM that is estimated with SUR10. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions is used for robustness purposes having in mind heteroscedasticity, the coefficients being 
estimated with OLS, and the covariance matrix being estimated with GLS.	  
 k 𝑨𝑫𝑭 𝑷𝑷 𝑲𝑷𝑺𝑺 ERS  
        
𝒕𝒕 2 -0.834 -0.702 2.004*** 
0.035 
99.416 
0.296*** ∆𝒕𝒕 1 -9.245*** -15.159*** 
        
𝒈𝒕 4 -0.693 -0.961 1.977*** 
0.118 
230.0583 
3.905* ∆𝒈𝒕 3 -5.727*** -18.802*** 
        
        
𝑪𝑬  𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝑬𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆  𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕. 𝑷 − 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒙  𝑬𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏  𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕. 𝑷 − 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 
None 0.056770 14.82668 0.0629 14.55290 0.0450 
At most 1 0.001099 0.273775 0.6008 0.273775 0.6008 
 𝑷𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒖  (𝟏𝟔) 𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝑱𝒂𝒓𝒒𝒖𝒆 − 𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒂 





Table 1. Unit Root, Cointegration Tests and Test VAR Adequacy Tests 
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 Concentrating on the ECT, two Error Correction Terms are estimated, this resulting 
from the asymmetric models estimated forward. Both ECT’s and estimated Cointegration 
















 Our analysis focuses on the adjustment coefficients present in the estimated VECMs, 
these coefficients indicating the fiscal aggregate’s response to budget disequilibria, thus being 
essential to understand how fiscal aggregates respond to deviations from a sustainable 
budgetary equilibrium. 
 Given the specification of the analysed variables, being natural logarithms, the ECT is 
also denominated in natural logarithms. The adjustment coefficients in each model are thus 
fiscal elasticities, that is, the percentage change of fiscal aggregates variation to a one-
percentage point variation from budget deviations. This allows us to focus on the sign and 
amplitude of each coefficient for a robust relative analysis of each derived fiscal adjustment 
parameter.  
 

















































1953-Q1 1968-Q3 1984-Q1 1999-Q3 2015-Q1
Quarters
(2)	  𝑒!!! = 𝑇! − 0.926 ∗ 𝐺! − 0.475  
Figure 2. Error Correction Terms, 1953:Q2 to 2015:Q2 and 2013:Q4 
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 Assuming that fiscal aggregates react linearly to budget deviations, we find 
statistically significant adjustment coefficients for both receipts and expenditures. Fiscal 
balance is thus achieved in the United States with both receipts and expenditure adjusting 
accordingly to departures from a sustainable budget equilibrium.  
   
 
  
 Focusing on the Partisan Model (Table 2), differentiating between Democrats and 
Republicans, we find that only Republicans tend to significantly adjust for budget deviations, 
the Republican’s adjustment coefficients being statistically significant. Adding to this, 
Republicans tend to be more sensitive than average, with adjustment coefficients and hence 
adjustment speeds from both fiscal aggregates being higher than the linearly derived. 
 Lifting the assumption of symmetric fiscal adjustments, we discriminate surplus and 
deficit budget departures so to capture possible asymmetric fiscal responses, deriving the Sign 
Model (Table 3). The imposition of sign asymmetry leads us to conclude that fiscal 
aggregates respond, in general, especially to deficit deviations. As identified in the Linear 
Model (Table 2), fiscal balance is achieved through a mixed adjustment of fiscal aggregates. 
 By assuming that Democrats and Republicans react differently to surplus and deficit, 
we construct the S&P (Sign and Partisan) Model present in Table 3. The S&P Model 
reinforces the initial result, that Republicans are highly sensitive to budget deviations. Indeed, 
the S&P Model enriches such result by decomposing this fiscal sensitivity – when dealing 
	   	   ∆𝑇	   ∆𝐺	     ∆𝑇 ∆𝐺 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  




(0.0119)	   P	  










Table 2. Linear and Partisan Asymmetric Models 
(1)   * Signals significant coefficients at least at a 10% Significance Level (P-Values in parenthesis). 
(2) ECT meaning Error Correction Term, D meaning Democrats and R meaning Republicans. 
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with surplus departures Republicans tend to adjust exclusively through receipts, while with 
deficits both aggregates are used to adjust for fiscal balance. 
   
 
 Focusing on Democrats, by imposing sign asymmetry these appear to be sensitive to 
deficitarian budget deviations. The adjustment to fiscal balance is achieved through 
expenditure.  
 By comparing the Democrat and Republican response to deficit departures (Figure 3), 
we are able to conclude that Republicans are much more deficit averse, adjusting significantly 
through both fiscal aggregates and in a higher proportion than Democrats.  








 The identified deficit aversion respects the expected Hibbsian macroeconomic profile, 
Republicans pursuing stricter fiscal discipline to achieve low inflation. On the other hand, the 
	   	   ∆𝑇	   ∆𝐺	   	   	   ∆𝑇	   ∆𝐺	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Figure 3. Fiscal Aggregates Response to Deficitarian Deviations 
(1)   * Signals significant coefficients at least at a 10% Significance Level (P-Values in parenthesis). 
(2) 𝐸𝐶! signalling positive ECTs while 𝐸𝐶! signalling negative ECTs (D meaning Democrats and R 
meaning Republicans). 



























Assuming Sign Asymmetry, Response to +1% Change in Budget Deviations























Assuming Sign Asymmetry, Response to -1% Change in Budget Deviations
Receipts Response to Deficitarian Deviations
Democrats Republicans
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line of adjustment for fiscal balance by both parties does not follow theory. Republicans 
appear to adjust deficit deviations primarily by taxation, hence increasing the extractive 
dimension of the State. Democrats adjust deficit by expenditure, counter-acting the theoretical 
and empirically advocated relation with increasing public spending. 
 Following the empirically advocated soft budget constraint, assuming that fiscal 
aggregates will react differently to budget disequilibria depending on its dimension, the 
Dimension Model (Table 4) is estimated. According to this model, both fiscal aggregates 
adjust significantly uniquely to uncommonly large deviations, suggesting that indeed fiscal 
aggregates in the United States follow a soft budget constraint. 
   
 
 
 When the Dimension Model is expanded with partisan sensitivity, we conclude that 
such soft budget constraint is entirely driven by Republicans. Indeed, through the D&P Model 
we are able to characterize the Republican fiscal dynamic as a soft budget constraint, that is, 
fiscal aggregates reacting significantly to abnormally dimensioned budget deviations. 
 Assuming fiscal aggregates respond differently to budget disequilibria depending on 
the character of such response, if it is automatic or discretionarily set, we make use of the 
fiscal multipliers narrative approach to discriminate between endogenous and exogenous 
fiscal responses, constructing the Exogeneity Model (Table 5). 
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Table 4. Dimension and Dimension/Partisan Asymmetric Models 
(1) * Signals significant coefficients at least at a 10% Significance Level (P-Values in parenthesis). 
(2) 𝐸𝐶!" signalling ECTs which surpass ±1 Std. Error while 𝐸𝐶!" signalling ECTs within a ±1 Std. 
Error interval (D meaning Democrats and R meaning Republicans). 
 

























Republican Response to -1% Change in Budget Deviations




























Republican Response to -1% Change in Budget Deviations
Expenditures Response to Deficitarian Deviations
General Unusual Exogenous
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 According to the derived adjustment coefficients, fiscal aggregates adjustment to 
budget deviations is solely significant when discretionarily imposed. When incorporating 
partisan asymmetries, the previously identified Republican sensitivity is accentuated. 
 The initial result that Republicans tend to be more sensitive to budget deviations is 
thus robust, the identified fiscal sensitivity by Republicans expanding in significance and 
aspect with each analysis extension, as noticeable in Figure 4. Republicans thus tend to be 
more sensitive to budget deviations, such sensitivity being discretionarily imposed and 








 Assuming political players will respond differently to budget disequilibria in elections, 
we construct the Election Model (Table 6). Subsequently, by investigating strategic 
Table 5. Exogeneity and Exogeneity/Partisan Asymmetric Models 
Figure 4. Republican Fiscal Aggregates Responses to Budget Disequilibria 
(3) * Signals significant coefficients at least at a 10% Significance Level (P-Values in parenthesis). 
(4) 𝐸𝐶!"  signalling ECTs which are discretionarily countered while 𝐸𝐶!" signalling ECTs which 
are automatically countered (D meaning Democrats and R meaning Republicans). 
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 Examining both models, fiscal aggregates do not respond significantly to budget 
disequilibria in elections periods. When expanding such models with partisan asymmetries, 
Republicans are particularly sensitive to budget departures when in election periods. 
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   ∆𝐺	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   ∆𝐺	  










































 To understand if Republicans tend to be more sensitive to deficit or surplus when in 
elections, the assumption of sign symmetry is lifted for both models (Table 8). Analysing the 
consequent models, we discern a clear electoral sensitivity to surplus deviations. In general 
Republicans are particularly sensitive to surplus departures when facing elections, 
expenditure being expanded above average. This electoral increase in expenditure seems to be 
directly linked with re-election motivations, an opportunistic behaviour being captured. 
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Table 6. Elections and Elections/Partisan Asymmetric Models 
(1)   * Signals significant coefficients at least at a 10% Significance Level (P-Values in parenthesis). 
(2) 𝐸𝐶!"# signalling ECTs within Election Periods while 𝐸𝐶!"  signalling ECTs within General 
Periods (D meaning Democrats and R meaning Republicans). 
(1) * Signals significant coefficients at least at a 10% Significance Level (P-Values in parenthesis). 
(2) 𝐸𝐶!"#$  signalling ECTs within Trigger- Election Periods while 𝐸𝐶!"# signalling ECTs within 
General Periods (D meaning Democrats and R meaning Republicans). 
Table 7. Trigger-Elections and Trigger-Elections/Partisan Asymmetric Models 
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 When facing trigger-elections, Republicans respond to surplus deviations with both 
fiscal aggregates, increasing expenditure and decreasing taxation11. The response to surplus 
departures is again higher than average (Figure 5), fiscal deficit being abnormally expanded. 
Assuming Republicans comprehend beforehand on a future Democrat victory, such atypical 
deficit expansion may have strategic motivations. Following Persson and Svensson (1989), 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	    Republican trigger-elections are independent from military buildups, the robustness of such result being attested. On the 
other hand, the derived general electoral effect can be partially driven by the Carter-Reagan Buildup. (See Technical 
Appendix, Figure 1). 
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Figure 5. Fiscal Aggregates Responses to Surplus Deviations 
Table 8. Election and Trigger/Sign/Partisan Asymmetric Model 
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7. Conclusion 
 Analysing the US fiscal dynamics from an asymmetric framework, by distinguishing 
between Democrats and Republicans, we empirically examine fiscal aggregates responses to 
budget disequilibria to understand how is fiscal balance achieved in the United States and if 
such achievement is influenced by political factors.  
 On a first note, we identify the political quadrant of the federal government as an 
acting determinant in the US fiscal dynamics. Indeed, Republicans comparing with 
Democrats tend to pursue stricter fiscal discipline, as advocated theoretically by Hibbs (1977). 
Such fiscal discipline is characterized by a significant deficit aversion. Focusing on the 
attainment of fiscal balance when dealing with unsustainable deficit deviations, Republicans 
tend to adjust through policy mixes, regulating both fiscal aggregates. Democrats on the other 
hand appear to adjust primarily through expenditure. 
 On a second note, by decomposing both budget deviations and fiscal responses we are 
able to attest the robustness of the initial conclusion, that is, that Republicans pursue a stricter 
fiscal balance.  
 Discriminating budget imbalances by dimension, we are able to attest the presence of 
a soft budget constraint in the United States, fiscal aggregates being significantly sensitive to 
abnormal budgetary deviations. When assuming politically motivated asymmetries, we 
determine that Republicans drive such soft budget constraint. 
 By distinguishing fiscal responses as automatic and discretionary, making use of the 
fiscal multipliers narrative approach, we identify an accentuation of the Republican fiscal 
discipline when concentrating on discretionarily imposed fiscal responses. We thus conclude 
on the discretionary character of the identified Republican fiscal discipline. 
 Finally, by exploring the timing of election, we identify a changing fiscal dynamic 
directly influenced by the election cycle. Indeed, when facing surplus departures in election 
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periods Republicans tend to expand expenditure above average, following Nordhaus (1975). 
On the other hand, when dealing with trigger-elections, Republicans tend to increase 
expenditure and decrease taxation at an abnormal rate, instilling atypical deficitarian pressures 
over the fiscal budget. This abnormal electoral behaviour seems to follow Persson and 
Svensson (1989), appearing to have strategic motivations. Fiscal policy thus appears to be 
utilized not only as an economic but also as a political instrument by policymakers in the 
United States. 
  Concentrating on the recovery of fiscal balance in the United States, we thus 
empirically identify political factors such as the federal government’s political quadrant and 
the election cycle as significant determinants over a non-linear fiscal dynamic. Such an 
empirical linkage is an addition to literature on US fiscal policy, allowing for a more detailed 
knowledge of fiscal dynamics and balance attainment. An incorporation of political 
asymmetries in a macroeconometric framework expanded by a narrative approach is also an 
addition to the US fiscal policy literature. 
 For future research, a discrimination of the budgetary disequilibria origin would allow 
for an exhaustive analysis over fiscal dynamics. Also, an exploration of fiscal multipliers 
within a political perspective would be of interest, that is, if fiscal aggregates affect 
differently the economy depending on the political quadrant of the government. Recurring to 
non-linear techniques such as TAR and MTAR, as in Arestis et al (2004), Ewing et al (2006) 
and Cipollini et al (2009) would allow the derivation of the Impulse Response Functions for 
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